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The ENP’s strong rhetoric in terms of the promotion of normative 
values, or “milieu goals”, has stimulated an interest in the aca-
demic  community  for  the  argument  that  the  EU  is  somehow  a 
“normative power”. This brief article will, however, sustain that the 
many contradictions inherent in the multifaceted EU’s foreign pol-
icy conducted in the Union’s relations with neighbouring countries 
makes it difficult, for the time being, to fully concur with the asser-
tion that the Union is a normative power. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
When  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP)  was  first 
launched it momentarily caused quite a stir in and around the Euro-
pean Union. The novelty of the ENP did not so much lie in the high 
normative component of the new policy – democracy, human rights, 
the rule of law had arguably also been part of many previous EU 
external policies. The originality of the ENP was rather its forceful 
language in terms of political conditionality. In its first Communica-
tion  on  the  ENP  the  Commission  proposed  that  relations  with 
neighbouring  countries  should  not  only  be  made  dependent  on  a 
demonstrated ability to effectively implement EU-promoted politi-
cal, economic and institutional reforms, but also made “a function 
of concrete progress in demonstrating shared values” (Commission 
2003; emphasis added). The impression of a European Union which 
was poised to become more forward-leaning in terms of value pro-
motion was later strengthened by the adoption of the European Se-
curity Strategy proclaiming that it was in Europe’s interest to have 
well-governed countries on its borders and that “[s]preading good 
governance…dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establish-
ing the rule of law and protecting human rights” are the “best means 
of strengthening the international order” (European Council 2003). 
 
Such a strong rhetoric in terms of the promotion of immaterial po-
litical objectives, or “milieu goals”, triggered a heightened interest 
in the academic community for the argument that the EU is some-
how a “normative power”.
1 This article will, however, sustain that 
the many contradictions inherent in the EU’s foreign policy vis-à-
vis the ENP area makes it difficult, for the time being, to fully con-
cur with the assertion that the Union is a normative power. What 
will, nonetheless, be argued in the final part of this article is that if 
the EU became more coherent in its foreign policy expression in 
terms of values, and using its instruments in a legitimate fashion, 
normative power could become a potentially significant additional 
foreign policy asset for the Union.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See for example special issue of Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2), 
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2.  The end and means of the normative power EU 
 
As  noted  by  several  authors,  the  concept  of  “normative  power 
Europe” (NPEU) is still largely under-theorized (Sjursen 2006; Pace 
2006). While a number of publications in recent years have referred 
to the topic, it is difficult to find a clear and precise definition of 
what normative power really entails. One could infer, however, that 
most analysts tend to use the concept in an implicit manner to de-
note  an  influential  international  actor  which  promotes  norms  be-
yond its territorial or institutional-functional confines.  
 
The conceptual lack of clarity shrouding the definition of the NPEU 
also extends itself to what standards to use in order to determine 
whether the EU is truly a normative power or not, although some 
promising attempts have been made (cf. Sjursen 2006). For this rea-
son, this article will borrow from the parameters used to explore the 
concept of civilian power.
2 Smith (2005) has argued that a civilian 
power  can  be  told  from  what  ends  it  pursues  (objectives),  what 
means it disposes (instruments) – and as seen through the prism of 
the ENP. 
 
2.1  Objectives for the NPEU? 
 
Manners, in one of his perhaps most detailed writings on the NPEU, 
sustains that the European Union is destined to be a normative actor 
as a consequence of a combination of the historical context in which 
the EC was created, its hybrid supranational-intergovernmental pol-
ity and its cumulative treaty based legal order (Manners 2002). To 
Manners and others writing about the NPEU, the exceptionalism in-
herent in the EU as a unique political construct in international rela-
tions compels the Union to have an equally sui generis foreign pol-
icy. In particular, Manners sustains that ‘the central component of 
normative power Europe is that the EU exists as being different to 
pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-
                                                 
2 A “civilian power” is for the present purposes an influential actor pursuing co-
operation to achieve its foreign policy objectives – preferring persuasive over co-
ercive measures – and principally through the use non-military instruments (cf. 
Hill 1990; Whitman 1998; Smith 2005). There is some debate in the academic 
community to whether a civilian power can possess and employ military instru-
ments. 184  European Political Economy Review  
   
disposes it to act in a normative way’ (Manners 2002: 242). Sjursen 
(2006: 235) concurs with that finding and argues that: 
 
“[a] number of empirical observations regarding issues such as the EU’s 
policy of democracy promotion, its introduction of human rights clauses in 
trade agreements, the emphasis on encouraging regional co-operation and 
its focus on strengthening international institutions could very well indi-
cate that there is something distinctive about the EU’s foreign policy, at 
least in comparison with what we tend to think of as the foreign policies of 
great powers”.  
 
However, there are several problems with such a depiction of the 
European Union as a foreign policy actor. First, it has been widely 
acknowledged that the argument of the EU somehow acting in a 
normative way in support of immaterial objectives is treacherous in 
that it seems to imply that the EU is acting for virtuous or altruistic 
reasons, portraying the EU as a “force for goodness in international 
society” (Jørgensen, Laatikainen 2004: 15; Sjursen 2006). Such a 
notion of the EU as a global player is surely self-gratifying to Brus-
sels-based EU officials. Nevertheless, one should be vary of that 
such a glorified reading of the EU’s impact on the international sys-
tem might give way to arguments in favour of (however benign) 
neo-imperialism, whereby it is contended that the Union could, and 
indeed should, develop into a “post-modern empire” for the benefit 
of global stability (cf. Cooper 2002).  
 
Indeed, when the ENP was first fielded in 2002 it went by the name 
of  “Wider  Europe”.  Officials  explain,  however,  that  the  policy 
would soon have to change name as the original designation evoked 
negative imagery in former colonial states, such as Algeria or Tuni-
sia, and revived fears of new forms of subjugations and dependency 
(Johansson-Nogués  forthcoming).
3  Moreover,  the  English  term 
‘Wider Europe’ also became troublesome as it was translated into 
other official EU languages. In Austria and Germany, for example, 
the tentative translation Größeres Europa would stir up the ghost of 
                                                 
3 Such fears cannot be discarded if one is to believe Marchetti (2006), who holds 
that geopolitical considerations are precisely the essence of the ENP: “The Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy is designed to establish a semi-periphery around the 
European Union. This functionalisation of neighbours has the advantage of buff-
ering and protecting by at the same allowing for an increased exchange between 
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World  War  II  Nazi  expansionism  (Interviews,  Brussels,  4  July 
2005). It is worth noting that the controversy which the issue of EU 
promoting norms, values and ideas as objectives of its foreign pol-
icy raises is perhaps much more pronounced and politicized in the 
ENP area than in the EU’s relations with other, further-flung re-
gions of the world. This illustrates that norms and values are impor-
tant  parts  of  EU  policy  and  should  remain  so,  however,  it  also 
shows that the Union has to be careful in its rhetoric in order not to 
offend anyone’s sensibilities. In the aftermath of the US-led inter-
vention in Iraq, where the lack of democracy and human rights has 
frequently been cited as motives behind the toppling of the Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, many countries, especially non-democratic Arab 
countries,  see  in  the  Western  normative  rhetoric  a  veiled  threat 
against their regimes. The unclear and less than transparent finalité 
of the ESDP, in particular the EU battle groups (coming into force 
2007), have further added to this generalized unease in the Arab 
world.
4 The EU therefore must be wary of coming on too strong 
with its normative discourse lest it will trigger the age-old security 
dilemma and cause instability in its neighbouring areas.  
 
A second problem with the NPEU argument is that the normative 
facet of the EU’s foreign policy has been elevated to a chief place 
among  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  objectives.  The  label  ‘normative 
power’ in and by itself indicates that its inventor conceived this di-
mension of the EU foreign policy to be the most important and the 
most descriptive of the nature of the EU as a international actor, at 
least more important than other ends the EU might pursue. However, 
the trouble of such a narrative of the EU foreign policy is that it 
tends to simplify, overlook and, at worst, fail to account for other 
equally important rationales behind the EU foreign policy. Almost 
four decades of rich academic debate – first over the European Po-
litical Cooperation and later the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy – has left us with many pieces of evidence for the different mo-
tivations  behind  EU  action,  whether  it  is  normative,  inter-
                                                 
4 EU neighbours are particularly worried over the ambiguities surrounding the 
ESDP, whether or not it will eventually develop further into a full-blown defence 
mechanism. Moreover, the lack of clearly defined rules of engagement of the EU 
battle groups is also a cause of concern. There is fear that the EU troops, to date 
not explicitly limited to act only upon UN Security Council approval, could per-
form on a Kosovo-style action alleging normative concerns. 186  European Political Economy Review  
   
institutional rivalries (Allen 1998, Emerson et al. 2005), commer-
cial interests, parochial geopolitical interests making member states 
reluctant to pursue norms with determined neighbouring countries, 
complex intra-Council trade-offs in regards to the southern or the 
eastern periphery (Barbé 1998) or “special relationships” based on 
notions of identity (Natorski 2006).
5  
 
In a complex framework policy such as the ENP all these objectives 
(normative, commercial, geopolitical, identities) compete with each 
other  in  dynamic  tension,  albeit  perhaps  not  on  an  equal  basis. 
Youngs (2004) has, for example, shown that normative promotion 
can be thought of as suffering from the same ills as many public 
policy goods where if there is a conflict for resources between par-
ticularistic interests and the common good (“tragedy of the com-
mons”), the latter often has to give way. The EU’s not-so-normative 
and ambiguous behaviour over Ukraine in response to the “Orange 
revolution” reveals this dilemma. The EU would first respond very 
cautious to the surge of pro-European, pro-reform movement, al-
though once the tide turned in favour of the democratic revolution-
aries the Union would seemingly intervene normatively in favour of 
democracy  by  sending  Javier  Solana  and  representatives  of  two 
member states to negotiate with Russia and Ukrainian opposition 
parties to allow a second round of elections to take place. However, 
once the democratic government of Yushchenko took office, other 
non-normative concerns driving the EU’s foreign policy would kick 
in. The EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan (originally accorded with Ku-
chma) was refurbished after the elections and in principle offered 
better trade relations, more aid, easier visas and closer cooperation 
(Wolczuk  2005).  However,  posterior  concretization  of  the  terms 
showed a less than generous offer. Trade restrictions on Ukraine’s 
principal export products, such as agricultural produce, textiles and 
steel continued to be important, whether through non-tariff barriers 
(e.g. technical and phytosanitary standards) or outright trade quotas. 
Financial assistance to the newly democratized country was to be 
delayed for inter-institutional battles between the Council and the 
                                                 
5 Examples of “special relationships” which Natorski cites are Spain / Morocco 
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In other words, contrary to the NPEU community’s expectation that 
the  exceptional  political  construct  pursues  an  exceptional  foreign 
policy, it would appear that at least in the ENP area the EU is noth-
ing but a “normal” political force. The EU foreign policy appears as 
an organic whole with multiple dimensions and in which competing 
visions of different intervening actors co-habit. One should not for-
get that the EU is a pluralistic political community. While some 
member states (and/or the Commission) may honestly pursue nor-
mative ends in some situations, they might not have their voices 
heard when faced with the concern of another member state for the 
impact trade liberalization would have on its metallurgic industry or 
agricultural sector. This pluralism can also be explained from the 
perspective of divergent political traditions among the EU member 
states. For example, northern member states tend to use their for-
eign aid in part for normative purposes, while southern EU mem-
bers have tended to think of external financial assistance as an in-
strument to promote commercial ventures (Gillespie 2004: 4). One 
can conclude that Manners’ expectation that the history of the EC, 
its hybrid polity and its legal order would suffice as a convergent 
force to contrive an amalgamated EU foreign policy expression in 
favour of the normative is far from about to be fulfilled. Nor does 
Manners’ affirmation that the EU as a promoter of norms displaces 
the state as the centre of concern seem sustained by the above em-
pirical evidence (Manners 2002: 236).  
 
2.2  The instruments of the NPEU? 
 
Long-standing  International  Relations  concepts  such  as  “civilian 
power” or “military power” have at their heart a focus on instru-
ments and capabilities. In contrast, the concept of normative power 
                                                 
6 National level foreign policy concerns would play into a certain backtracking on 
the visa liberalization in its first stages. A scandal involving the then German for-
eign minister Joschka Fischer was uncovered during the technical negotiations to 
grant Ukraine a more liberal visa regime. Fischer faced accusations of complicity 
in long-term visa fraud involving thousands of Ukrainian citizens, among others 
and as a result, the German government forced a change in the EU text making it 
more restrictive than originally proposed. 188  European Political Economy Review  
   
is ‘an attempt to refocus analysis away from the empirical emphasis 
on the EU’s institutions or policies, and towards including cognitive 
processes, with both substantive and symbolic contents’ (Manners 
2000). The NPEU argument therefore wants to shift the reference 
frame away  from a focus on instruments (“what the EU does or 
what it says”) and towards focusing on what the EU is in order to 
avoid ‘an unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU 
looks’ (ibid).  
 
However  –  and  this  perhaps  being  the  most  sustained  criticism 
against the NPEU concept – not only is the NPEU projection debate 
very much couched in terms of EU instruments, but also, and possi-
bly as a consequence, the NPEU concept becomes almost indistin-
guishable from Duchêne’s civilian power notion.
7 Duchêne (1973: 
19-20) argued that the EC should use its foreign policy instruments 
and idée force (magnetic attraction) for normative ends in order to 
‘domesticate’ relations between states. One could argue that it is, 
for this reason, not clear how the normative power concept can truly 
further our understanding of the EU’s impact on the international 
system in comparison to already existing concepts. 
 
Nevertheless, in order to continue with the discussion here we will 
simply accept Manners (2002) argument at its face value. Manners 
holds that there are six principal substantive and symbolic ways in 
which the EU promotes values: contagion (EU as a source of attrac-
tion for third parties); informational (declarations, demarches), pro-
cedural (institutionalized relationships), transference (trade norms, 
political conditionality), overt diffusion (EC delegations) and cul-
tural  filter  (political  learning).  Now,  turning  our  attention  to  the 
ENP, the policy arguably allows both for substantive (political dia-
logue, trade norms, cooperation, financial and technical assistance 
etc.) and symbolic (EU attraction, political learning) transmission of 
norms.  
 
First, as for the substantive transmission of norms, the Action Plans 
are perhaps the most tangible element of the ENP so far. Here one 
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using the terms “civilian power” and “normative power” as synonyms for each 
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can  nonetheless  see  an  important  discrepancy  between  what  was 
proposed in the Commission’s ENP Strategy paper and what was 
later accepted by the ENP partners (Commission 2004). The ENP 
Strategy Paper is replete with references to normative action, some-
times very concrete in reference to different regions of the ENP area. 
However, as the first waves of Action Plans were concluded it be-
came clear how little progress over status quo could be reported. 
The commitments to values are rather vague in the finalized Action 
Plans. Across the board the pledges for normative reform are kept in 
a very general language and without specifying what exact meas-
ures in terms of democracy, human rights and liberties should be 
taken by partners in order to obtain new “privileges” from the EU. 
At another level, contradictions are also evident in the above al-
ready mentioned meagre contents of the refurbished ENP Action 
Plan with Ukraine, compared to with the ease that non-reformist 
Tunisia obtained a fairly far-reaching Action Plan without having to 
make any substantial concessions in the normative realm (e.g. nei-
ther in terms of free and fair elections or even easing restrictions on 
political opposition or civil society etc.) (Johansson-Nogués 2004).  
 
Second, as for the symbolic transmission of norms, it relies pre-
dominantly on the NPEU’s power of attraction (“soft power”).
8 It 
has been readily acknowledged both by practitioners and academics 
that the perspective of EU enlargement has in the past decade been 
the EU’s biggest “carrot” for prodding on change beyond its borders. 
For example, one of the major factors motivating the Central and 
Eastern Europe countries to pursue reform was the lure exerted by 
the  EU  as  a  successful  politico-economic  community.  However, 
without this “carrot”, as a consequence of the moratorium the mem-
ber states have put on further enlargement rounds, the NPEU soft 
power  projection  is  currently  noticeably  circumscribed.  Hence, 
without the stimulus of the membership perspective, how can the 
EU promote milieu values in the ENP area?  
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that the EU’s soft power could 
still prove to have an effect on those countries which, in spite of the 
                                                 
8 Nye has coined and popularized the expression “soft power” referring to the 
ability of an actor to use its attractiveness in terms of culture, political ideals and 
policies to draw other actors closer (Nye 1990, 2004). 190  European Political Economy Review  
   
Union’s  reluctance,  continue  to  harbour  the  hope  that  the  EU’s 
doors will open again one day in the future, such as Georgia or 
Ukraine.  Their  expectation  would  rest  on  that  if  their  respective 
countries reform satisfactorily by ways of the ENP framework, in-
cluding in the terrain of norms, their “European dream” will even-
tually come true the day the Union is ready and willing to once 
more absorb new member states.
9  
 
On the other hand, and as for the rest of the ENP partners, the EU’s 
capacity to transmit norms will be very different. However, para-
doxically  perhaps  here  the  idea  that  the  EU  can  have  normative 
power (as opposed to being one) could become key to the Union’s 
success. Nye (2004) has held that soft power is an essential attribute 
of an international actor, in that through soft power it “may obtain 
the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – 
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
prosperity and openness – want to follow it.” What appears to be 
undermining the EU’s normative power projection in the ENP area 
at the moment is above all the many contradictions between com-
peting normative and parochial concerns. What is more, given the 
EU’s past fickleness in terms of normative promotion, ENP partners 
will be forgiven for questioning the EU’s willingness to act posi-
tively for norms now. The “shadow of the past” thus impairs the 
EU’s foreign policy standing in these countries. The EU must there-
fore boost its soft power vis-à-vis the ENP partners. One might infer 
that the way to do that could be by enhancing the coherence in its 
foreign policy objectives and actions as well as legitimacy when 
applying its instruments. Hence, to “act in a normative way” would 
then mean that if particular interests clashed with obligations under-
taken by the EU, the commitments would still be respected by the 
EU member states (i.e. coherence). Coherence in this perspective is 
not so much a structural feature of the rules themselves, but a politi-
cal ideal or guiding principle at work both in the construction of 
norms and in their interpretation and application (Lerch, Schwellnus 
                                                 
9 The Georgian aspirations are very tangible, as Leonard and Grant (2005) have 
reported: “[a]ll public buildings in downtown Tbilisi fly EU flags next to Geor-
gian ones. The flags are a symbol of Georgia’s determination to integrate itself 
into the West after the “rose revolution”, and a reminder of the potency of the 
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2006). Moreover, the legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy, both in 
its use of civilian and military instruments, could be derived from 
being consistent with agreed legal norms and “[i]f coercion were 
used,  it  would  be  so  only  in  consistence  with  existing  legal  ar-
rangements  and  in  order  to  uphold  the  respect  for  such  arrange-
ments” (Sjursen 2006: 245). This would seem particularly important 
in terms of the burgeoning military instruments that the Union has 
at its disposal. To avoid creating unnecessary fears among the ENP 
partners the EU should end the ambiguity surrounding the ESDP 




2.  Conclusion: Exceptionalism revisited 
 
Can we thus conclusively draw the conclusion that the EU is unique 
and this makes it act in a normative way? In other words is the EU 
an exceptional actor and the ENP an exceptional policy? The NPEU 
argument is very seductive on many levels in that it blends together 
the ontological with the normative. Indeed, one would wish for the 
EU to be different from other actors (especially in light of the US 
veer towards military power unilateralism) and act for the better-
ment  of  the  international  system  in  an  altruistic  spirit.  However, 
from the evidence related to the ENP area one must conclude much 
more mundanely that the EU is a normal political force in interna-
tional  relations.  Such  finding  should  not  surprise  anyone,  Smith 
(2005), for example, has noted that most international actors hail 
themselves on a continuum between ideal (utopian) models of civil-
ian  and  military,  with  no  actor  hailing  at  either  extreme.  Even 
Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy must be seen as inspired by a sense 
of moral conviction and not only by realpolitik (Sjursen 2006). The 
aim of this article has not been to invalidate any arguments that al-
low us to account for normative behaviour as a “rational choice” 
nor to nullify the relevance of normative conviction in foreign pol-
icy as an extension of identity. On the contrary, the argument put 
forward here is only to highlight the danger of only focusing on one 
single dimension of a multifaceted foreign policy making, making 
us emphasize some parameters and overlook others. To this author 
it seems overly rash to single out one factor – the normative – as the 192  European Political Economy Review  
   
most dominant or most descriptive of the type of actor the EU is in 
international affairs. 
 
The survey of the ENP also reveals more normalcy than exception-
alism. So far there is little evidence to the fact that the ENP is trying 
to live up to the strong language used at the policy’s outset in fa-
vour of normative promotion. The ENP has rather come to once 
more  highlight  the  many  conflicting  interests  and  ideas/norms 
which co-exist within the heterogeneous making of the EU foreign 
policy. The ENP therefore essentially repeats the patterns and proc-
esses  of  its  policy  predecessors  such  as  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
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